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Future While Managing China’s 
Blue Water Ambitions 
Michael J. Kelly* 
“[W]e all came from the sea. . . . [W]e have salt in our blood, in 
our sweat, in our tears. We are tied to the ocean. And when we 
go back to the sea, whether it is to sail or to watch it we are 
going back from whence we came.”1 
―John F. Kennedy, September 14, 1962 
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I. Introduction 
The time has come for America to return to the sea. On her 
recent trip to China, ostensibly to develop better bilateral relations, 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had her diplomatic hat handed 
to her. Secretary Clinton endured repeated attacks in state-run 
Chinese media declaring the United States a “sneaky troublemaker” 
because it was pushing other states to challenge Chinese sea claims.2 
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research & 
International Programs, Creighton University School of Law. This essay 
is offered in the context of Case Western’s symposium “Presidential 
Power, Foreign Affairs, and the 2012 Election.” Regardless of which 
party controls the Presidency or the Senate in 2013, the author 
encourages ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention. 
1. President John F. Kennedy, America’s Cup Dinner Speech at Newport, 
Rhode Island (Sept. 14, 1962), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/ 
Researchold/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/Remarks-at-the-America-
Cup-Dinner-Given-by-the-Australian-Ambassador-September-14-
1962.aspx. 
2. Steven Lee Meyers & Jane Perlez, Smiles and Barbs for Clinton in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at A9. 
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China’s renewed assertion of claims to wide swaths of ocean in the 
teeth of counter-claims by rival powers like Japan and smaller states 
like Vietnam and the Philippines have pushed the United States into 
the awkward position of reassuring regional states that it backs 
stability and security in the area, while at the same time not 
provoking one of its largest trading partners. As a non-party to 
UNCLOS, the United States has failed in both tasks.  
For the past two decades, both Democratic and Republican 
presidents have urged the US Senate to approve the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)3 without success. 
Despite near universal agreement that the benefits of joining this 
multilateral treaty far exceed any drawbacks, US ratification has not 
been forthcoming.4 Latent, largely unfounded sovereignty concerns 
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397; Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of 
the Convention, G.A. Res. 48/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263 (July 28, 
1994) [together, hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
4. See CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA REPORT, S. REP. NO. 110–9, 
at 3 (2007), available at http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/UNCLOS-
Sen-Exec-Rpt-110-9.pdf (noting there are 155 states party to the 
Convention, 131 party to the subsequent Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI, and all NATO members are party, except 
Turkey and the United States). According to Congress’ legislative 
tracking service, UNCLOS was formally submitted to the Senate for 
advice and consent by President Clinton in 1994 and was reported out 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably twice–once in 2004 
under Chairman Richard Lugar (R) and once in 2007 under Chairman 
Joseph Biden (D). Chairman John Kerry (D) has begun moving the 
treaty through the committee process again. Once a treaty is favorably 
reported out of committee it goes to the full Senate, but if the Senate 
does not act on the recommendation to provide advice and consent 
before the legislative session expires, the treaty returns to the committee 
to be reconsidered in the next session. Below is the legislative history of 
Senate floor action on this treaty: 
Floor Action:  October 07, 1994—Received in the Senate and 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations by unanimous 
consent.  
Committee Action:  February 25, 2004—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported without amendment 
favorably.  
Committee Action:  October 14, 2003—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Hearings held. Hearings printed: S.Hrg. in 
Ex. Rept. 108-10.  
Committee Action:  October 21, 2003—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Hearings held. Hearings printed: S.Hrg. in 
Ex. Rept. 108-10. 
Floor Action:  March 11, 2004—Reported favorably by 
Senator Lugar, Committee on Foreign Relations with printed 
Ex. Rept.108-10 and a resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification with declarations and understandings. Executive 
Calendar No. 13. 
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appear to be holding back a sufficient minority of Senators from 
consenting.5 However, China’s recently assertive moves in oceanic 
affairs, coupled with its new and quickly developing naval capability, 
make US ratification all the more urgent.  
II.  Background: China’s Rise as an Oceanic Presence 
History has shown that great powers operating within a 
multilateral legal framework agreement like UNCLOS or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) balance one another to the benefit of all 
parties. By joining UNCLOS and operating within that system, the 
United States would be better able to more legitimately check China’s 
Floor Action:  December 20, 2004–No further action at sine 
die adjournment of the 108 Congress; automatically rereferred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations under the provisions of 
Rule XXX, section 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate. 
Floor Action:  December 20, 2004—Rereferred to Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations.  
Committee Action:  September 27, 2007—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Hearings held.  
Committee Action:  October 04, 2007—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Hearings held. Hearings printed: S.Hrg. 110-
592.  
Committee Action:  October 31, 2007—Committee on 
Foreign Relations. Ordered to be reported without amendment 
favorably. 
Floor Action:  December 19, 2007—Reported by Senator 
Biden, Committee on Foreign Relations with printed Ex. 
Rept.110-9 and a resolution of advice and consent to ratification 
with declarations, understandings, and conditions. Executive 
Calendar No. 9. 
Floor Action:  January 02, 2009—No further action at sine die 
adjournment of the 110th Congress; automatically rereferred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations under the provisions of 
Rule XXX, section 2, of the Standing Rules of the Senate.  
Committee Action:  May 23, 2012—Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings held.  
Committee Action:  June 14, 2012—Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings held.  
Committee Action:  June 28, 2012—Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Hearings held.  
 
 Treaties, 103rd  Congress (1993–1994), 103-39, THOMAS, http://tho 
mas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ntquery/z?trtys:103TD00039: (last visited Jan. 3, 
2013). 
5. See Letter to Majority Leader Harry Reid from Thirty Senators, 
reprinted in Julian Pecquet, Tide Turns Against Law of the Sea Treaty, 
THE HILL’S GLOBAL AFFAIRS BLOG (July 11, 2012), http://thehill.com 
/blogs/global-affairs/un-treaties/237383-law-of-the-sea-treaty-four-votes-
shy-of-being-doomed- (stating the treaty is “inconsistent with American 
values and sovereignty”). 
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behavior. Doing so from the position of an outsider, even though the 
United States recognizes the key provisions of UNCLOS as binding 
custom, weakens Washington’s position. Moreover, the United States 
has little or no say in the dispute resolution mechanisms available to 
UNCLOS member states. 
There is much hand-wringing among great powers over the rise of 
China. Much of this worry concerns not so much arresting China’s 
rise, but rather managing it in a peaceful and beneficial way. But 
rising powers historically resist such foreign handling. After displacing 
Germany and Japan as the world’s second largest economy last year,6 
a spot that alternated between both for decades, China is poised to 
claim the mantle of “great power.”7 With that title come natural 
ambitions. One of these, for China, is a dramatically increased oceanic 
presence.  
To effectively deal with China’s surprisingly forceful oceanic 
diplomacy, the United States must understand Beijing’s perspective 
and appreciate the suspicion with which the Chinese government 
views the United States. As Professor Andrew Nathan and Dr. 
Andrew Scobell note: 
The world as seen from Beijing is a terrain of hazards, 
beginning with the streets outside the policymaker’s window, to 
land borders and sea-lanes thousands of miles away, to the 
mines and oil fields of distant continents. These threats can be 
described in four concentric rings. In the first ring, the entire 
territory that China administers or claims, Beijing believes that 
China’s political stability and territorial integrity are threatened 
by foreign actors and forces. Compared with other large 
countries, China must deal with an unparalleled number of 
outside actors trying to influence its evolution, often in ways the 
regime considers detrimental to its survival. Foreign investors, 
development advisers, tourists, and students swarm the country, 
all with their own ideas about how China should change. 
Foreign foundations and governments give financial and 
technical support to Chinese groups promoting civil society. 
Dissidents in Tibet and Xinjiang receive moral and diplomatic 
support and sometimes material assistance from ethnic 
diasporas and sympathetic governments abroad. Along the 
coast, neighbors contest maritime territories that Beijing claims. 
Taiwan is ruled by its own government, which enjoys diplomatic 
6. Stephanie Flanders, China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second Biggest 
Economy, BBC, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
12427321. 
7. Andrew J. Nathan & Andrew Scobell, How China Sees America, 
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 32, 32. 
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recognition from 23 states and a security guarantee from the 
United States.  
At China’s borders, policymakers face a second ring of security 
concerns, involving China’s relations with 14 adjacent countries. 
No other country except Russia has as many contiguous 
neighbors. They include five countries with which China has 
fought wars in the past 70 years (India, Japan, Russia, South 
Korea, and Vietnam) and a number of states ruled by unstable 
regimes. None of China’s neighbors perceives its core national 
interests as congruent with Beijing’s.  
But China seldom has the luxury of dealing with any of its 
neighbors in a purely bilateral context. The third ring of 
Chinese security concerns consists of the politics of the six 
distinct geopolitical regions that surround China: Northeast 
Asia, Oceania, continental Southeast Asia, maritime Southeast 
Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia. Each of these areas presents 
complex regional diplomatic and security problems.  
Finally, there is the fourth ring: the world far beyond China’s 
immediate neighborhood. China has truly entered this farthest 
circle only since the late 1990s and so far for limited purposes: 
to secure sources of commodities, such as petroleum; to gain 
access to markets and investments; to get diplomatic support 
for isolating Taiwan and Tibet’s Dalai Lama; and to recruit 
allies for China’s positions on international norms and legal 
regimes. . . . 
In each of China’s four security rings, the United States is 
omnipresent. It is the most intrusive outside actor in China’s 
internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the 
largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, 
the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s 
neighbors, and the primary framer and defender of existing 
international legal regimes. This omnipresence means that 
China’s understanding of American motives determines how the 
Chinese deal with most of their security issues.8 
This anxiety plays out in contradictory ways. China is by far the 
largest investor in US debt,9 and the United States is one of China’s 
largest export markets.10 Yet the Chinese government remains 
insecure with the bilateral Sino-American relationship because of the 
8. Id. at 33–35. 
9. China Increases Its US Debt Holding for Second Month, BBC, Apr. 16, 
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17737572. 
10. China, US TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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very reasons Professor Nathan and Dr. Scobell articulate above. 
Consequently, Chinese sensitivity to what it perceives as American 
meddling with respect to its sovereignty concerns is unusually high. 
III. China’s Oceanic Claims 
Three areas of renewed Chinese focus in this regard are assertions 
of sea claims in the East China Sea, much larger sea claims in the 
South China Sea, and meaningful participation in the Arctic Council 
now that significant polar ice melt has opened trans-Arctic sea lanes. 
To be sure, as the globe’s manufacturing hub, China’s vault into great 
power status rests on expansive foreign trade. This trade requires 
secure trade routes for large fleets of merchant vessels and, eventually, 
a deployable blue water navy (which they are quickly developing).11 
But Chinese assertiveness of late has bordered on belligerency.  
Beijing’s claim over the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu in Chinese), 
small uninhabited islets in the East China Sea south of Japan and 
north of Taiwan, overlaps with Tokyo’s own claim and actual 
possession. This has led to unfortunate incidents such as Chinese 
fishing trawlers colliding with Japanese patrol boats,12 prompting 
Japan to actually purchase the islands from the Japanese family that 
owned them—a move which China regarded in its official press as 
“the most blatant challenge to China’s sovereignty since the end of 
the second world war.”13 
But Japan’s purchase was actually motivated by a desire to keep 
a lid on the dispute. The right-wing nationalist governor of Tokyo 
Prefecture was set to purchase the islands and use them as a political 
wedge to rally Japanese nationalists against China’s claim.14 The 
central government’s preemptive purchase avoided this political 
problem but unwittingly handed China, which is undergoing its own 
once-per-decade power transition within the communist government, a 
propaganda bonanza to whip up anti-Japanese sentiment within a 
China (always a sure bet to distract the Chinese people from their 
real concerns regarding their own repressive government). 
11. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33153, CHINA 
NAVAL MODERNIZATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NAVY CAPABILITIES, 
Summary (2012). See generally Michael J. Kelly & Sean M. Watts, 
Rethinking the Security Architecture of Northeast Asia, 41 VICTORIA U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. (N.Z.) 273 (2010). 
12. Kirk Spitzer, The South China Sea: From Bad to Worse, TIME, July 15, 
2012, http://nation.time.com/2012/07/15/the-south-china-sea-from-bad 
-to-worse/. 
13. Senkaku Islands Dispute Escalates as China Sends out Patrol Ships, 
GUARDIAN (UK), Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2 
012/sep/11/senkaku-islands-china-patrol-ships. 
14. Id.  
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China decided to go further and actually pressed its legal case on 
possession of the Senkaku Islands publically. A bellicose, two-page, 
full color ad in the New York Times announced in large type, “Diaoyu 
Islands Belong to China.”15 In this politically-charged diatribe, China 
laid out its legal case for all to see. That one permanent member of 
the UN Security Council decided to take this action in the largest 
newspaper of another permanent member is remarkable:  
China had already discovered and named Diaoyu Island by the 
14th and 15th centuries. . . . In the early years of the Ming 
Dynasty, China placed Diaoyu Island under its coastal defense 
to guard against the invasion of Japanese pirates along its 
southeast coast. . . . Maps . . . published in Britain in 1811 and 
1877 [and the United States in  1859] all marked Diaoyu Island 
as part of China’s territory. . . . On April 17, 1895, the Qing 
Court was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War and forced to sign 
the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki and cede to Japan Taiwan 
along with Diaoyu Island. . . . The 1943 Cairo Declaration and 
the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, which laid out the terms for 
the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, obliged the 
country to return all the Chinese territories it had forcibly 
occupied. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese government 
accepted the Potsdam Proclamation in explicit terms with the 
Japanese Instrument of Surrender . . . . China has opposed the 
backroom deals between the United States and Japan 
concerning Diaoyu Island [citing the transfer to US control and 
subsequent “return” to Japanese control during the 1950s and 
1970s]. . . . China’s will to defend national sovereignty and 
territorial integrity is firm and its resolve to uphold the 
outcomes of the World Anti-Fascist War [World War II] will 
not be shaken by any force.16 
While a successful Chinese claim would yield valuable new 
exclusive fishing and natural resource development zones of 
approximately a 200 nautical mile radius extending from each islet in 
the Senkaku chain, this pales in comparison to China’s most 
spectacular claim—the entire South China Sea.17 The extent and 
audacity of China’s claim extending south from Hainan Island all the 
way to Malaysia is breathtaking. Not only does it trample on the rival 
claims of several Southeast Asian states that enjoy greater proximity 
to the Sea itself, China’s claim also presents the United States with a 
geo-strategic quandary. 
15. Advertisement, Diaoyu Islands Belong to China, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 
2012, at A16. 
16. Id. 
17. Spitzer, supra note 12.  
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Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has 
enjoyed unchallenged primacy as possessing the world’s largest blue 
water navy. And Washington has not shied away from deploying this 
force to further its interests, including in the South China Sea.18 But 
such force projection requires freedom of navigation, a right 
guaranteed by the UNCLOS. Moreover, as half the world’s shipping, 
over $5 trillion annually, passes through the South China Sea, 
protecting this right is paramount.19 
 
      
Figure 120 
Agreed to in 1982 and in force since 1994, UNCLOS establishes 
the legal framework for nautical sovereignty claims of coastal states. 
Such states may claim a twelve nautical mile (n.m.) band of water 
immediately offshore as their territorial sea and an additional 200 
n.m. of water as their exclusive economic zone, within which they 
may assert dominance over natural resource exploration and 
exploitation.21 In the South China Sea, this amounts to vast fishing 
rights and control over oil reserves estimated at 213 billion barrels 
18. See, e.g., US Military Carrier Enters South China Sea, HINDUSTAN 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/ 
Americas/US-military-carrier-enters-South-China-Sea/Article1-
948281.aspx. 
19. Spitzer, supra note 12.  
20. UNCLOS & CIA (2012).  
21. See Raul Pedrozo, Which High Seas Freedoms Apply in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone?, 1 LOS REP. 1, 1–2 (2010). 
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(larger than Saudi Arabia’s).22 But within such waters, coastal states 
must also guarantee freedom of navigation rights for other states.23 
This basic framework of oceanic sovereignties is an extension of 
territorial sovereignty. As such, sea claims “run with the land.” In 
order for China’s claims to go forward, Beijing must successfully 
assert sovereignty over bits of land from which it can draw those 
lines. Figure 1 depicts the sovereignty claims of China, and the EEZ’s 
of Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia in the South China 
Sea. 
To shore up its island claims, China has begun building on, 
populating and militarizing these specks of land, taking a play from 
Japan’s playbook when Tokyo built up the Okinotori reefs in the 
1980’s to bolster its own claim.24 Japan, however, did not face 
competing claims. In this case, Beijing has moved 620 “residents” to 
Yongxing Island where they are provided with electricity, drinking 
water, an airstrip, and military protection, and who have 
subsequently elected a forty-five person legislature.25 This islet is less 
than a square mile and lies southeast of Hainan.26 
In response to alarmed and negative reaction to its assertion of 
sovereignty over the South China Sea, Beijing contends it does not in 
fact wish to claim the entire sea, “only 80 percent.”27 Smaller states 
with overlapping claims in the South China Sea have worked within 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) political 
apparatus to arrive at a multilateral solution.28 However, the draft 
ASEAN “code of conduct” in the South China Sea, which seeks to 
settle disputes peacefully and keep the waters mostly demilitarized, 
was scuttled by Cambodia, the regional host for the July 2012 
ASEAN meeting, at the urging of Beijing.29 To reinforce its message, 
China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, warned the Philippines to 
22. Spitzer, supra note 12. 
23. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 58.  
24. Yukie Yoshikawa, Okinotorishima: Just the Tip of the Iceberg, HARV. ASIA 
Q., Winter 2005, at 51, 52.  
25. Jane Perlez, China Asserts Sea Claim with Politics and Ships, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at A6. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See Daniel Ten Kate & Nicole Gaouette, ASEAN Fails to Reach Accord 
on South China Sea Disputes, BLOOMBERG, July 12, 2012, http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-12/asean-fails-to-reach-accord-on-
south-china-sea-disputes.html.  
29. Id.  
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“avoid making trouble” with respect to competing claims over reefs in 
the South China Sea.30 
China understands it would lose in a multilateral environment 
with an array of states working against it. Thus, it prefers to deal 
with states (much smaller states) in bilateral settings where it can 
better leverage its power. That said, China realizes it cannot bully 
larger states to get its way in oceanic matters. The waters of the 
Arctic Ocean are largely controlled by the eight polar states, Canada, 
Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, the United States (via 
Alaska), and Denmark (via Greenland).31 Collectively, they set policy 
for the region through the Arctic Council—a body created in 1996 to 
promote cooperation and coordination of activities.32 Since the 
opening of trans-Arctic waterways in the wake of global climate 
change-induced ice melt, this has suddenly become a very important 
body for states that engage in a lot of global shipping or are home to 
large petroleum exploration companies seeking to develop vast 
hydrocarbon reserves that are now becoming accessible.33  
China possesses these twin interests. But it does not possess a 
seat on the Arctic Council or even permanent observer status. As an 
“ad-hoc observer,” China must request permission to attend each 
individual meeting of the Council.34 Beijing very much wants to 
advance its status to permanent observer (like Britain, France, and 
Germany)35 so it can attend all the meetings as of right and 
potentially participate in working groups and task forces, which are 
the forums that shape access policies with respect to navigation and 
natural resource development. 
But Norway opposes China’s entry on human rights grounds. A 
diplomatic spat occurred in the wake of Oslo awarding Chinese 
dissident Liu Xiaobo the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, and Beijing has 
not sufficiently made amends with the Norwegians, who could block 
30. Id. 
31. See Member States, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.or 
g/index.php/en/about-us/members (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
32. History, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php 
/en/about-us/history (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
33. Joyce Man, China Vies for Seat at Council on Arctic Resources and 
Trade Routes, GLOBAL POST (Jul. 31, 2012), http://www.globalpost. 
com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/120629/arctic-council-oil-
natural-resources. “The US Geological Survey estimates of the world’s 
undiscovered fossil fuels, 13 percent oil and 30 percent natural gas are 
north of the Arctic circle.” Id.  
34. See id.  
35. Id. 
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China’s advancement in the organization.36 Unable to intimidate 
European states as it is able to do elsewhere, China must resolve this 
issue diplomatically if it’s more pragmatic oceanic interests are to be 
pursued. 
IV. Conclusion: Importance of U.S. Ratification of 
UNCLOS 
All of the states in all of the above situations are parties to the 
Law of the Sea Convention except the United States.37 Even though 
Washington recognizes many of the UNCLOS provisions as binding 
custom, the United States is still the outsider. As such, it is difficult 
for the United States to force compliance with UCNLOS provisions 
and impossible to avail itself of dispute resolution features as a 
party—the threat of which could induce better Chinese cooperation, 
especially in the case of island claims. 
The rest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
belong to UNCLOS, as do the rest of the Arctic Council members, all 
of the Antarctic claimants, all of the South China Sea claimants, and 
all of the other North Pacific regional powers except North Korea. 
Not only will Washington not be able to contain China through 
UNCLOS, as a non-party, the United States will not be able to stake 
its own nautical claims for fossil fuel development or even challenge 
the claims of others like Russia, which has staked out a region in the 
Arctic the size of France and Spain combined for exclusive Russian oil 
and natural gas development.38 
It is manifestly in the United States’ interest to ratify UNCLOS 
in the next session of Congress. Multiple presidents from both parties 
have supported ratification in addition to the Pentagon and the 
environmental lobby.39 The original hesitancy by private industry in 
the United States of handing deep seabed mining authority over to 
the United Nations in the recovery of manganese deposits has 
evaporated. The benefits of joining clearly outweigh any vague 
36. Id. As of 2012, Norway appears ready to open discussion with China on 
this issue. Id.  
37. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions of and 
Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 07 
November 2012, OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ra
tifications.htm#The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(last updated Nov. 2, 2012).  
38. See Bob Reiss, Cold, Hard Facts: The U.S. Trails in Race for Top of 
the World, POLITICS DAILY (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.politicsdaily. 
com/2010/03/13/cold-hard-facts-u-s-trails-in-race-for-the-top-of-the-
world/. 
39. Id. 
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sovereignty concerns. Perhaps the biggest immediate benefit would be 
the ability of the United States to throw the rulebook at China’s feet 
on its oceanic claims in the same way that it can with respect to 
China’s trading practices within the World Trade Organization—an 
analogously effective multilateral tool the United States uses to help 
manage China’s rise to great power.40 
 
40. See Press Release, US Trade Rep., Obama Administration Challenges 
China’s Export Subsidies to Auto and Auto Parts Manufacturers in 
China (Sept. 17, 2012),  available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/pre 
ss-office/press-releases/2012/september/obama-administration-
challenges-china-auto-subsidies.  
[T]he United States has requested dispute settlement 
consultations with the Government of China at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) concerning China’s auto and auto parts 
“export base” subsidy program. Under the program, China 
provides extensive subsidies to auto and auto parts producers 
located in designated regions, known as “export bases,” that 
meet export performance requirements. China’s program appears 
to provide export subsidies that are prohibited under WTO rules 
because they severely distort trade. The subsidies provide an 
unfair advantage to auto and auto parts manufacturers located 
in China, which are in competition with producers located in the 
United States and other countries. Based on publicly available 
documents, “export bases” made at least $1 billion in subsidies 
available to auto and auto-parts exporters in China during the 
years 2009 through 2011. 
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